ABSTRACT. Castles are some of JapanÕs most iconic structures and popular tourist destinations. They are prominent symbols of local, regional, and national identity recognized both at home and abroad. Castles occupy large areas of land at the centre of most Japanese cities, shaping the urban space. Many castles have their roots in the period of civil war that ended in the early seventeenth century, and now house museums, parks, and reconstructions of historic buildings. The current heritage status of JapanÕs castles obscures their troubled modern history. During the imperial period (1868Ð1945), the vast majority of premodern castles were abandoned, dismantled, or destroyed before being rediscovered and reinvented as physical links to an idealized martial past. JapanÕs most important castles were converted to host military garrisons that dominated city centres and caused conflict with civilian groups.
Castles were more than just historic sites in imperial Japan (1868Ð1945), and Kishida was one of many scholars who formulated cultural theories on the basis of JapanÕs castle architecture. The previous year, the architectural historians Ōrui Noboru (1884Ð1975) and Toba Masao (1899Ð1979) wrote of JapanÕs castles that they Ôwere of severe simplicity but of commanding force. Free from any showiness such as might have been born of feminine minds, those castles were so made as to be expressive of fearless composure of mind, invincible fortitude, unshaken faithÑthe qualities representing the noblest mind and the highest spirit of the samurai.Õ Further linking past and present, they continued, ÔWhat may be seen in the same light is the Japanese sword of olden times, as well as the Japanese warship of modern times. Their beauty is of the samurai, viz. of the inherent spirit and soul of the Japanese people.Õ 2 Writings in Japanese were even more explicit. In his monumental 1936 study of Japanese castles, the prominent castle researcher and architect Furukawa Shigeharu (1882Ð 1963 argued that castles were vital in this time of Ônational emergencyÕ, that threatened JapanÕs very existence. According to Furukawa, Ôancient castles are nothing other than the background for and an extension of the bushido spirit (Ôthe way of the warriorÕ) that was born from the pure ÒJapanese spiritÓÕ. Furukawa lauded the recent designation of castles as national treasures, as they were symbols of the Ôsolid bushido ideals that flowed through all of the nationÕs citizensÕ and mandated Ôbenevolent self-sacrificeÕ. Furukawa invoked key elements of the imperial ideology, including the notion of warriors Ôfalling like cherry blossomsÕ, and that Ôduty is heavy as a mountain while oneÕs [mortal] body is light as a featherÕ, paraphrasing the 1882 Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors. The parallels drawn by castle researchers reflected the close relationship between castles and militarism, which was mediated through an idealized samurai masculinity that was held up as the model for all Japanese in the first half of the twentieth century. KishidaÕs English text was also a response to this sentiment, emphasizing JapanÕs supposedly peaceful nature for a foreign readership in the face of contemporary events. A similar contradiction was evident in the Pan-Pacific Peace Exhibition, a Ômega-eventÕ held in Nagoya in 1937. In spite of its name, the exhibition drew on castle imagery in its promotional materials, and included live-fire exercises, torpedo demonstrations and many other military events. 4 As this study argues, castles played a key symbolic and practical role in the militarisation of JapanÕs urban society in the decades before 1945. This dynamic echoed developments in other countries, but was ultimately unique to JapanÕs historical conditions.
Historians examining the Second World War in Asia have long debated the applicability of the term ÔfascismÕ to Japan, as well as the idea of a Japanese Sonderweg by which modernization led to war. 5 Scholarship during and after the war was often teleological, tracing Japanese militarism to at least the establishment of imperial rule at the beginning of the Meiji period (1868Ð1912). 6 The supposed Japanese focus on hierarchies, especially the emperor, was fundamental to Ruth BenedictÕs (1887Ð1948) influential The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (1946) . 7 The narrative that a small clique of militarists exploited a traditional Ôcultural weaknessÕ to manipulate society into imperial expansion and war was useful to Americans and Japanese seeking to bury the past and forge a new alliance in the early Cold War. army conducted its own castle research with the assistance of Toba Masao and other leading scholars from 1932 onward. 13 On the ground, civil society groups sought public access to castles that were restricted military spaces. At the heart of these tensions was an almost universal appreciation of castles throughout Japan. Popular interest in castles, combined with the identification of castles with the modern army, led to a convergence of civilian and military culture and space. This convergence in turn contributed significantly to the militarisation of urban society in the decades before 1945.
In the following, this study begins with an overview of castles in the Meiji period, when they were dismissed as feudal relics to be demolished, sold, or repurposed, often for use 
Castles in the modernizing process
Between 1867 and 1868, a confederation of domains from southwestern Japan overthrew the Tokugawa shogunate that had ruled Japan since the turn of the seventeenth century. Hoisting the banner of imperial loyalty, the victorious rebels created a new government centred around the fifteen-year-old Meiji emperor. This ÔrestorationÕ of an ancient system of imperial government simultaneously ended more than six centuries of 13 Nakai Hitoshi, ÒHonpō chikujō shi hen iinkai to Nihon jōkaku shi shiryō ni tsuite,Õ Chūsei jōkaku kenkyū, 7 (1993) 34Ð53. In the 1980s, the postwar generation of scholars held vigorous debates on the role castle researchers played in supporting JapanÕs wartime efforts. For an overview of these debates, see: Yamaki Takao, ÔMeiji kara haisen made no jōkaku kenkyū no nagare ni tsuite,Õ Chūsei jōkaku kenkyū 1:10 (1987) 184Ð232.
warrior rule. The Tokugawa system had been ostensibly founded on the authority of the samurai class as the martial rulers of Japan, even if this military order oversaw more than 250 years of peace during its tenure. The best-known accoutrements of warrior power included the two swords that all samurai were exclusively obliged to carry, as mentioned by Ōrui and Toba above. In order to ensure the stability of the Tokugawa order, samurai were physically removed from their lands and made to live in the more than two hundred castle towns, the main centres of population in early modern Japan. Each castle town was the administrative centre of a domain, the ruler of which pledged loyalty to the Tokugawa but had considerable autonomy in his own lands.
One important restriction on domain lords, or daimyō, in the Tokugawa period was the requirement that they spend alternate years in the capital, Edo (later Tokyo), the ultimate castle town and possibly the largest city in the world by 1700, with over one million inhabitants. In addition to their lavish residences in the capital, the daimyō were each required to maintain a castle in their domain. In order to prevent rebellion against the shogunate, castle modifications and construction had to be approved, and each domain was ostensibly limited
by the shogunate to a single castle. Castle maintenance weakened the daimyō financially, as most domains spent roughly ten percent of their annual revenue on the upkeep of walls, moats, bridges, residences, and other structures. 14 There was considerable dissatisfaction with this arrangement, as castles were merely symbols of military and state power. There had been no significant military conflict in Japan since the early seventeenth century, and the design of the Japanese castle had changed little since the peak of its development around this time, while developments in weaponry had rendered them militarily obsolete.
For many daimyō, the Meiji restoration presented an opportunity to achieve their long-standing aims to relieve themselves of the burden of castle maintenance. in scale was that Japanese cities lacked defensive walls, and all of the fortification work was centered on the castle. The castle in turn had to be of a sufficient size to compensate for the absence of merchant storehouses and other potential supporting infrastructure within. Perhaps the most important factor was the different pace at which changes in the military occurred in Europe relative to Japan. 22 In Europe, medieval castles had been obsolete for centuries, and urban fortifications were repurposed, sold off, dismantled, and worn down as their land and materials continued to be valuable long after they lost their military meaning. Those that survived into the modern period typically did so on a considerably smaller scale than urban castles in Japan.
In Japan, these processes which took centuries in Europe occurred at a greatly accelerated rate. The 1860s were dominated by samurai in regional militias, although there were some attempts to introduce Western weaponry and drill. 23 To consolidate its power, suppress unrest, and resist foreign threats, however, the Meiji government created a modern conscripted national army. The samurai were deemed to be obsolete and a potential threat to the new order. The rapid transitions in the early 1870s meant that the planned establishment of the Imperial Japanese Army occurred when the fate of the newly-obsolete castles had yet to be resolved, and it was decided that these should hold the new military garrisons.
Following a nationwide survey undertaken by a team from the War Ministry in 1872, roughly fifty-eight castles and other fortifications were selected for military use. Another 144 castles, along with over 100 other sites, were given to the finance ministry for ÔdisposalÕ. 24 Many of these surplus castles were auctioned off and dismantled, converted into official or unofficial public parks, repurposed to house schools and administrative buildings, or underwent a combination of these transformations. The castles designated for military use included the largest and most important structures, and in 1873 regional commands were set up in the castles in Sendai, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto. Fourteen infantry regiments were subsequently established, of which one was located with each of the six regional commands. The other infantry regiments were located mainly in castle sites elsewhere, in some cases with their battalions spread across multiple sites. Outside of Tokyo, for most of the period 1874Ð84, infantry regiments and battalions were based in and around fourteen former castles, as well as five other non-castle sites. The expansion of the military in the 1880s added ten infantry regiments, all of which took over former castle sites. 25 At all of these sites, most or all existing buildings were sold off or demolished and replaced by modern barracks and other facilities. With regard to the few infantry regiments and battalions outside of former castles in the period before 1894, these were located primarily in cities that had not been castle towns, or represented auxiliary sites in cities where the army was already using the castle space.
Castles and the discovery of heritage
Before the turn of the twentieth century, the military took a practical approach to castles. Its priorities were recruiting and training a modern force, maintaining order through several major rebellions in the 1870s, and fighting major wars with China (1894Ð5) and Russia (1904Ð05). A few important castle structures were repaired during this time, most significantly the wooden keeps at Nagoya, Himeji, and Hikone, which were among the largest in Japan. These structures were unofficially protected by the Imperial Household Ministry, which donated money for the most urgent repairs in 1878 and 1879, but many other gates, outbuildings, and walls continued to be demolished or removed at castle sites throughout Japan. These early efforts to preserve castles were limited and driven by a These early protection efforts were few and far between, however, and did not extend to a broader appreciation of castles, which were still widely viewed as ÔfeudalÕ relics.
Attitudes only began to shift from the 1890s, in line with a popular reassessment of the Japanese past. While the first two decades of the Meiji period had been dominated by movements towards modernization and Westernisation under the banner of Ôcivilisation and enlightenmentÕ, a nativist backlash against foreign influences began to gather strength from the 1880s as part of a search for a ÔJapaneseÕ identity. 29 In Japan, as in other newly-created nation-states, the creation of a national identity also entailed the rehabilitation of discredited symbols of the premodern past, including both samurai and castles. At the same time,
Western practice continued to serve as a model, and the rehabilitation of the Japanese past favored those aspects that had European equivalents. This could be seen most clearly in the rehabilitation of the samurai, which was done primarily through the formulation of the ideology of bushido, the so-called Ôway of the warriorÕ. Although bushido was portrayed as an ancient ethic and the very Ôsoul of JapanÕ, it was largely a product of the 1890s, and was heavily inspired by Victorian ideals of chivalry and gentlemanship that were admired in Japan at the time. Promoted as an ethic that guided all Japanese, bushido was given apparent legitimacy by its supposed relationship with the idealized former samurai, as well as by its correspondence with contemporary Western ideals. exhibitions. Meanwhile, the real Nagoya Castle keep remained a highly restricted bastion of authority and could only be viewed from afar by ordinary Japanese, as shown in Figure 3 .
In 1906, Kōfu, a former castle town in the mountains west of Tokyo, held a major regional exhibition in the spacious grounds of its ruined former castle. The organizers used the occasion to build a temporary keep out of wood at the highest point of the ramparts.
Illuminated by electric lights, this structure proved widely popular, with over 23,000 people paying the two Sen price of admission to climb the keep during the six weeks of the exhibition. 38 Four years later, in the city of Gifu northwest of Nagoya, the Gifu City Preservation Society took advantage of a new bridge construction to build their own keep atop the ramparts of Gifu Castle. It had never previously had a keep. Using scrap materials from the old bridge, the Society built a two-storey structure with metal siding atop the mountain overlooking the city, which became a tourist draw and a popular destination for hikers. 39 The decade after 1910 also saw the first major publications on Japanese castles, as well as articles in national newspapers, including by the art historian Ōrui Noboru, who highlighted the ÔmasculinityÕ of Japanese castles in 1912. 40 By the 1910s, castles were popular tourist destinations, and were firmly established as symbols of local, regional, and national identity throughout Japan.
Military castles and urban society in Taisho Japan
The conflicts with China and Russia were accompanied by major expansions of the Imperial Japanese Army. Relative to the period before the Sino-Japanese War, the number of regular physically strong with a loyal character of honest simplicity, while urban conscripts were suspected of having been exposed to socialist ideas and other Ôdangerous thoughtÕ.
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These tensions were heightened by the disruptive behaviour of soldiers in the entertainment districts and elsewhere, as they often failed to recognize the authority of civilian police. 48 In addition, the military restrictions on access to castle space led many municipalities to try and remove the army from castles and relocate them to the outskirts of the city. It was hoped that this would mitigate the problems associated with the military presence, while continuing to reap the economic benefits it brought. In cities including
Himeji, Matsuyama, Kumamoto, Nagoya, and Toyohashi, the Taisho period saw civilian movements to remove infantry regiments from castle sites in order to promote economic growth and provide greater public access and movement through city centres.
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The conflicts between the public and military in urban Japan reached a climax in August 1918. Beginning in Toyama Prefecture on the Japan Sea coast, disturbances and riots protesting against sudden increases in the price of rice spread throughout Japan, bringing more than a million people to the streets over the course of several weeks. The riotersÕ targets included rice sellersÕ shops, police stations, and other emblems of wealth and authority.
Countless buildings were destroyed, and residents of Osaka recounted feeling Ôas though a revolution had really come.Õ 50 The police and other civilian authorities were overwhelmed by the scale of the disturbances, and could often only stand idly by or even retreat to avoid falling victim to the violence themselves. In response, many local governments were forced to send requests to the army to suppress the riots, a measure that was especially effective in areas with urban castle garrisons that could be immediately deployed when necessary.
In Osaka, after three days of unrest the mayorÕs office sent a request to the army to deploy Fourth Division troops, who quickly restored order. 51 Nagoya saw a similar timeline, with up to 50,000 rioters burning down rice merchantsÕ shops and police stations over the course of three days, until the prefectural governor requested soldiers from the Third Division in Nagoya Castle, who put down the protests in often violent clashes with protestors. 52 Newspaper reports from throughout Japan showed the extent of the disturbances and the importance of urban castle garrisons in restoring order. Nationally, army troops were mobilized on sixty occasions during the Rice Riots, using live ammunition and bayonets. 53 The total number of troops mobilized from has been estimated at 92,000, with hundreds of fatalities on both sides. 54 The majority of soldiers were deployed from castles, as in Nagoya and Osaka. In Kokura, after rioters destroyed trains and ransacked shops for alcohol, soy sauce, clothing, and other goods, mounted military police and soldiers from the Fourteenth Infantry Regiment moved out from the castle to pacify the city. In Himeji, troops from the Tenth Infantry Regiment and special forces patrolled the city and arrested thirty rioters. In
Sendai and Shizuoka, hundreds of soldiers overpowered thousands of rioters. 55 In AizuWakamatsu, the Sixty-Fifth Infantry Regiment moved out of the third bailey of the castle to quickly suppress the riots. 56 Although the rioters often coordinated their movements to outflank the police, they were no match for the soldiers and their weaponry. Riot suppression was more difficult in cities that did not have urban garrisons, as in Kōchi, where several police officers were injured when they attempted to confront the mob. 57 Here, the castle had already been converted into a public park when the Forty-Fourth Infantry Regiment arrived after the Sino-Japanese War, and the army set up in Asakura Village five kilometers west of the city centre.
The response to the Rice Riots demonstrated civilian authoritiesÕ dependence on the military to suppress serious unrest. In Tokyo, although the capital did not experience as much disturbance as regional cities in 1918, the army played a decisive role in 1923 in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake. This disaster is estimated to have killed more than 100,000 people, and tremors and fires destroyed much of the city. The army assisted in firefighting and relief efforts, but also used the chaos to pursue groups deemed ÔundesirableÕ by the government. The military police murdered prominent anarchists, and contemporary accounts strongly suggest soldiers were involved in the killing of thousands of Koreans living in Tokyo. 58 Certainly, the declaration of martial law immediately after the earthquake gave the army control over the city. In spite of the atrocities, many people appreciated the superficial stability brought by military authority in the wake of the earthquake, which even led to a moderate improvement in popular views of the army.
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By the early 1920s, the army was established as the ultimate arbiter of physical force in major urban areas, and this caused considerable tension with civilian society. Individual soldiers, for example, often suffered abuse when they ventured out of the garrisons into public. 60 Tensions were also due to the relatively large size of garrisons, as JapanÕs military developed initially from the German model, maintaining a large standing army relative to exceptionally large influence within the military from the early Meiji period, when it provided ninety per cent of total personnel. 63 Castles further raised the infantryÕs profile in society by giving it a significant urban presence, especially in contrast with the navy which was massed in dedicated ports well away from major cities.
Castles and military soft power
The struggles over the control of urban space in imperial Japan reached a climax in Osaka in the 1920s. At the start of the Meiji period, Osaka was a prime candidate for the new capital of Japan, and the castle was slated to host the emperor, military, and civilian government.
Although most of these functions were ultimately moved to Tokyo, Osaka Castle became a house as having usurped his power. 70 Around the time of the Sino-Japanese War, Hideyoshi was widely hailed in official and popular campaigns for his invasions of Korea in the 1590s, which were portrayed as models for modern Japanese imperial expansion. 71 In 1915, on the 300 th anniversary of the fall of Osaka Castle to the Tokugawa armies and the death of HideyoshiÕs son, Hideyori (1593Ð1615), Hideyoshi was posthumously awarded the highest court rank. 72 Hideyoshi and the castle became fixed points of identification for Osakans, especially in the Taisho period as the city grew rapidly in size and population.
Having become aware of the popularity of the castle, the army sought to mobilise its symbolic value to mitigate anti-military feeling. The army regularly hosted public events in the parade grounds, and flights to Kyoto also departed from within the castle. 73 As elsewhere in Japan, military manoeuvres and regimental festivals were highlights of the social calendar and drew thousands of onlookers, including members of the imperial family. These events generated countless souvenirs that relied heavily on castle and samurai imagery. Shops operated by the army in the castle and inside the Takashimaya department store sold official postcards, maps, and other souvenirs relating to the castle, army, and Toyotomi Hideyoshi. 74 Newspapers regularly reported visits to the castle by Japanese and foreign dignitaries. Castles also served educational purposes, such as when more than three thousand students were invited to Osaka Castle in 1919 for a tour of the historic ramparts and demonstrations of artillery and a new tank design. Coverage of the event included photographs of children admiring the tank as well as the commanding views across Osaka from atop the ramparts. 75 Through these events, the army sought to reduce public animosity and establish its own legitimacy as the caretaker of Hideyoshi and OsakaÕs heritage as embodied by Osaka Castle.
In 1923, the influential Seki Hajime (1873Ð1935) became mayor of Osaka, following several years in other high offices in the municipal government. Seki oversaw many ambitious plans to raise both the profile of Osaka and general quality of life in the city, even if these aims were sometimes in conflict and not always realized. The first of these goals was attained in 1925, when a redistricting plan helped OsakaÕs population reach two million people, temporarily surpassing Tokyo and making Osaka the sixth largest city in the world. 76 This was known as the ÔGreat(er) Osaka periodÕ (Dai Ōsaka jidai). This rapid expansion was difficult to reconcile with one of SekiÕs other long-standing concerns, to grow Ôthe lungs of the cityÕ by creating more green space in Osaka. 77 The bleak conditions in industrial Osaka are reflected in photographs of the skyline from 1914 (Figure 4) . 78 The dearth of parks and other public spaces in Japanese cities was a major concern nationwide, and was highlighted by the historian Charles Austin Beard (1874Ð1948), brought in to consult on TokyoÕs urban planning in 1923. 79 SekiÕs push for park creation was in response to the miserable living experience with shrine construction. 89 The lack of detailed historical materials complicated the project, as did the selection of HideyoshiÕs early keep rather than the more extensively documented Tokugawa keep, for which the ramparts were designed. 90 The use of concrete also caused problems, as the centuries-old ramparts had to be reinforced to withstand the 11,000-ton keep. 91 The project was also delayed by personnel issues, with several key people leaving before its completion in 1931. Furukawa himself left early that year due to an unspecified personal conflict, but made his thoughts on the project known in a detailed book on the subject that ran to almost 500 pages and established him as one of the most authoritative castle researchers in Japan. 92 One of FurukawaÕs complaints related to the lack of Ôhigh-level researchÕ into the historical castle, which frustrated the attempts to accurately recreate the Ômasculine shapeÕ of HideyoshiÕs original keep. 93 The Osaka Castle keep was opened on November 7, 1931, in a major ceremony attended by hundreds of prominent persons, including Seki, the head of the Fourth Division, and the city council. Celebrations were held throughout the city, with parades and extensive decorations. Newspapers focused on the contribution of the Ôpeople of OsakaÕ in rebuilding the keep, which instantly became the symbol of the city ( Figure 5 ). 94 The connection with Osaka residents was further reinforced by restricting entry to the keep to locals for the first nine days of its opening, while the inside of the keep contained a local history museum as well as a special exhibition on Hideyoshi. The keep also had broader national significance, and its opening officially commemorated the enthronement of the Showa emperor several years before. The national appeal of the keep could be seen in events such as a November addition to these events, tens of thousands of ordinary people visited the castle, taking in the military installations and the imposing new headquarters building along the way.
The building of the Osaka Castle keep was a national event that both reflected and influenced broader trends elsewhere, especially major cities with large castles and military presences. In Sendai in the Northeast, tensions between the public and the Second Division resulted in an agreement whereby the city built a new gate for the army, which opened part of the castle as a park in 1926. 96 In Kumamoto in the Southwest, the civilian Kumamoto Castle
Preservation Society worked to restore a seventeenth-century turret in 1927, attracting over 100,000 visitors in its first year of opening. Kumamoto Castle was controlled by the Sixth Division, and the public interest in the castle resulted in competing plans to reconstruct the lost keep by the army and preservation society. These conflicts contributed to the fact that the keep reconstruction was not realized, even though both sides invoked commemoration of the imperial enthronement, as in Osaka. 97 In Nagoya, where most of the castle was controlled by the Third Division, the castle keep was opened to the public in 1931. The keep was JapanÕs largest original castle structure, and after it had served as an imperial detached palace for more than three decades, the Imperial Household Ministry donated the main bailey along with the keep to the city in 1930 to avoid paying for costly maintenance and repair. 98 Within a few months, the keep and other structures were listed as national treasures and opened to the public, thereby bringing together military, civilian, and imperial interests in a popular and publicly accessible space. 
